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Abstract
To study the short-run and long-run implications on wage inequality, we introduce
directed technical change into a Ricardian model of o¤shoring. A unique nal good is
produced by combining a skilled and an unskilled product, each produced from a continuum
of intermediates (tasks). Some of these tasks can be transferred from a skill-abundant West
to a skill-scarce East. Prot maximization determines both the extent of o¤shoring and
technological progress. O¤shoring induces skill-biased technical change because it increases
the relative price of skill-intensive products and induces technical change favoring unskilled
workers because it expands the market size for technologies complementing unskilled labor.
In the empirically more relevant case, starting from low levels, an increase in o¤shoring
opportunities triggers a transition with falling real wages for unskilled workers in the West,
skill-biased technical change and rising skill premia worldwide. However, when the extent
of o¤shoring becomes su¢ ciently large, further increases in o¤shoring induce technical
change now biased in favor of unskilled labor because o¤shoring closes the gap between
unskilled wages in the West and the East, thus limiting the power of the price e¤ect
fueling skill-biased technical change. The unequalizing impact of o¤shoring is thus greatest
at the beginning. Transitional dynamics reveal that o¤shoring and technical change are
substitutes in the short run but complements in the long run. Finally, though o¤shoring
improves the welfare of workers in the East, it may benet or harm unskilled workers in
the West depending on elasticities and the equilibrium growth rate.
JEL Classication: F43, O31, O33.
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1 Introduction
The rapid rise of o¤shoring, which involves many production and service tasks previously
produced domestically being sourced from abroad, has been one of the most visible trends
in the US labor market over the last three decades.1 The share of imported inputs in total
intermediate use in the US manufacturing, for example, has increased from about 6% in 1980 to
over 27% today (Feenstra and Jensen, 2009) and by now intermediate inputs accounts for two
thirds of world trade. The production structure of Apples video iPod gives a glimpse of these
trends. Though designed and engineered in the United States, the overwhelming majority of
the production jobs created by this product are located abroad (Linden et al. 2011). Despite
its prevalence, the implications of o¤shoring for wages, skill premia and incomes are still
debated. The iPod example illustrates its di¤erent potential e¤ects. Though most production
jobs related to the iPod are o¤shored, a signicant number of high-skill engineering jobs and
lower-skill retail jobs are created in the United States, and more than 50% of the value added
of the iPod is captured by domestic companies. With more limited o¤shoring, some of the
production jobs may have stayed in the United States, increasing the demand for the services
of lower-skill production workers.
The potential negative e¤ects of o¤shoring on incomes and/or the wages of lower-skill work-
ers in advanced economies (the West) have been emphasized by Feenstra and Hanson (1996),
Deardor¤ (2001, 2005), Samuelson (2004) and Hira and Hira (2008), among others. Samuelson,
for example, famously pointed out how o¤shoring could lower Western incomes in a Ricardian
trade model if it transfers knowledge to less advanced, lower-wage economies (the East),
thus eroding the Western technological advantage in a range of tasks. Counteracting this are
the e¢ ciency gains due to o¤shoring, emphasized by several authors including Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and Rodriguez-Clare (2010), which potentially benet both skilled and
unskilled workers in the West.
Our focus in this paper is on the impact of o¤shoring on the direction of technical change
and the equilibrium wage structure within the West and between the West and the East.2
Though there is a vibrant debate on the exact contribution of skill-biased technical change to
wage inequality in the United States and other advanced economies, there is a broad consensus
that the more rapid rise in the demand for skills than the supply has been at the root of much
of it and that more skill-biased technologies, at given factor supplies, tend to increase wage
inequality. It is also evident that o¤shoring opportunities should impact the skill bias of
technology. We can illustrate this again with the example of Apple products; without the
1O¤shoring is not an entirely new phenomenon. The term production sharingwas coined in 1977 by Peter
Drucker to describe activities such as the assembly of electronic equipment in South Korea and Singapore, or
cloth processing in Morocco, Malaya and Indonesia. Extensive media coverage of labor market implications
of o¤shoring exploded before the 2004 US presidential election. Current concerns are well captured by what
BusinessWeek (2008) denes as one of todays burning questions: Is American tech supremacy thanks to heavy
investments in R&D also beneting US workers? Or are US inventions mainly creating jobs overseas?
2We use the terms technological changeand technical change interchangeably.
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opportunity to o¤shore assembly tasks, it may not have been protable for Apple to introduce
some of the new varieties of iPods because of the higher labor costs it would have faced.
This would have reduced the demand for high-skill engineering and design jobs in Apple,
corresponding to the price e¤ectwhich creates a positive link between o¤shoring and skill-
biased technical change. Counteracting this, without o¤shoring opportunities, Apple may have
designed iPods di¤erently in order to reduce its dependence on expensive domestic unskilled
labor, with potentially adverse e¤ects on the demand for unskilled workers in the United States;
this illustrates the market size e¤ectwhich creates a negative link between o¤shoring and
skill-biased technical change. Our objective is to provide a systematic framework to investigate
and quantify these economic channels.
In our model, a unique nal good is produced by combining a skilled and an unskilled
product, each produced from a continuum of intermediates (tasks). O¤shoring takes the form
of some of these intermediates being transferred to the East and is subject to both xed
and variable costs. Prot-maximizing incentives determine not only how much o¤shoring will
take place in equilibrium, but also the rate at which the productivities of both skilled and
unskilled sectors improve. An important implication of o¤shoring highlighted by our model is
the e¢ ciency-enhancing reallocation of production towards countries where wages are lower.
This e¢ ciency e¤ect is stronger when there is little o¤shoring, because the wage gap between
the West and the East is greatest in this case. By increasing the demand for labor in the East,
greater o¤shoring closes this gap.3
Our main results concern the e¤ects of o¤shoring on equilibrium technologies. O¤shoring
encourages skill-biased technical change by increasing the relative price of skill-intensive prod-
ucts. Simultaneously, it encourages unskilled labor-biased (henceforth, with some abuse of
grammar, unskill-biased) technical change because it expands the market size of technolo-
gies complementary to unskilled workers, which can now be used in the East. In the empirically
more relevant case where the elasticity of substitution between intermediates (tasks) is greater
than the elasticity of substitution between skills and starting from low levels of o¤shoring,
the price e¤ect dominates and greater o¤shoring opportunities induce skill-biased technical
change.4 The opposite pattern obtains and o¤shoring induces unskill-biased technical change
when the level of o¤shoring is high. This result turns on the Ricardian features of our model:
rst, the e¢ ciency gains are strongest when o¤shoring is limited, and second, o¤shoring closes
3Though our main contribution is on the e¤ects of o¤shoring on technical change, our model of o¤shoring
with xed technology has implications on the skill premium that are related to, though di¤erent from, those
emphasized in the literature. In particular, o¤shoring tends to increase the skill premium through a labor
supply e¤ect and a relative price e¤ect, and tends to reduce it through the e¢ ciency e¤ect. This e¢ ciency
e¤ect, which is based on the complementarity between Western and Eastern workers, is related to Grossman
and Rossi-Hansbergs (2008) productivity e¤ect, but also di¤erent in a crucial way as highlighted by the fact
that it is more pronounced when there is a large wage gap between East and West (and thus little o¤shoring)
and it vanishes as the wage gap falls a feature that is at the center of many of our key results.
4Here it is important to interpret o¤shoring broadly as taking place both in production tasks and interme-
diates produced by unskilled workers, particularly because, as we discuss in footnote 16 below, most of the
estimates on the relevant elasticity of substitution come from trade data on intermediates.
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the wage gap between East and West, and when this wage gap is small, the price e¤ect on the
direction of technical change is muted.5
This conguration thus yields one of our main qualitative results an inverse U-shaped re-
lationship between o¤shoring and the direction of technical change. In consequence, o¤shoring
will rst increase wage inequality in the West both through its direct e¤ect and by triggering
skill-biased technical change. As o¤shoring continues, however, technical change will eventu-
ally change direction and become unskill-biased, thus limiting the increase in wage inequality.
Throughout, as expected, o¤shoring also compresses (unskilled) wage di¤erences between the
East and the West.
Although our model lacks several important factors shaping wage inequality in the United
States (including changes in the domestic supply of skills, institutional factors and other deter-
minants of the types of technologies introduced at di¤erent times), it is nonetheless consistent
with the qualitative picture that emerges from several decades of changes in the US wage
structure. The rst wave of expansion of o¤shoring in the 1980s coincided with a sharp decline
in the real wages of unskilled workers, but as o¤shoring continued to expand in the late 1990s
and 2000s, unskilled wages stabilized and began rising (e.g., Acemoglu and Autor, 2010). Con-
sistently, our results suggest that the impact of o¤shoring on wage inequality should have been
strongest when the volume of trade in intermediates was limited, as in the 1980s. As such, it
also circumvents the standard criticism directed at trade-based explanations of inequality that
the volume of trade between the United States and developing countries was then too small to
have a meaningful impact on wages.6
The dynamics of technology and wages in response to an expansion of o¤shoring opportu-
nities is also interesting, highlighting that the two activities are substitutes in the short run,
but complements in the long run: immediately after the change in o¤shoring opportunities,
technical change stops for a while because rms rst spend resources to o¤shore their exist-
ing intermediates/tasks; this is followed by a phase of either skill-biased technical change (for
levels of o¤shoring below a critical threshold) or unskill-biased technical change (for levels of
o¤shoring above a critical threshold). Our welfare analysis shows that if the post-o¤shoring
equilibrium rate of technical change is su¢ ciently high, then o¤shoring contributes positively
to the welfare of all workers. However, because o¤shoring creates a capital loss (by reducing
5The impact of o¤shoring on the direction of technical change is quite di¤erent than the impact of trade on the
direction of technical change. For example, in Acemoglu (2003) trade induces skill-biased technical change when
intellectual property rights (IPR) are not enforced internationally, but induces unskill-biased technical change
when they are fully enforced. Here because o¤shoring is a voluntary, and thus protable, activity for rms, its
qualitative impact on the direction of technical change is independent of international IPR enforcement, though
changes in IPR has additional implications for the direction of technical change. Other sources of di¤erences
result from the Ricardian aspects of our model which, as explained above, ensure that o¤shoring closes the wage
gap between East and West, and from the e¢ ciency e¤ect mentioned in footnote 3.
6Our model is also broadly consistent both with Bloom et al. (2011), who nd that the surge of imports
from China from the late 1990s encouraged investments in information technology across European industries,
and with Autor et al. (2012), who show that it also reduced the demand for labor in US local economies heavily
exposed to this import competition.
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the value of existing rms), it can in principle harm workers in the West (especially, unskilled
workers) depending on elasticities and growth rates. In particular, if the post-o¤shoring growth
rate is su¢ ciently high, all workers benet from o¤shoring, but otherwise both skilled and un-
skilled workers in the West can lose out. Our quantitative results suggest that while Eastern
workers benet most and unambiguously, Western unskilled workers are most likely to su¤er
as a result of o¤shoring, while Western skilled workers typically obtain limited gains.
The tractability of our framework also enables us to extend it to include the o¤shoring of
skilled intermediates. This more general model conrms the main results discussed so far. It
also naturally yields a new result: o¤shoring can increase wage inequality both in the West and
the East simultaneously a possibility that is generally precluded in standard trade models
(see Wood, 1994). This happens because, despite the presence of complete specialization and
technological di¤erences across countries, a zero-prot condition implies a form of conditional
factor price equalization: if o¤shoring costs are identical, prot maximization implies that, with
o¤shoring, the skill premium has to be the same in the East as in the West.7 Finally, we study
the transition of the East from low-productivity imitation to higher-productivity o¤shoring,
which leads to a pattern of transition reminiscent of the Chinese process of economic growth
over the last three decades, with productivity gains due to reallocations from imitation to
o¤shoring and no wage growth.
Our paper is related to three literatures. First, it is a contribution to the growing literature
on o¤shoring already mentioned above.8 Our main point of departure from this literature is
the endogeneity of the direction of technological change. Glass and Saggi (2001), Naghavi and
Ottaviano (2009), Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010), Branstetter and Saggi (2011), Rodriguez-
Clare (2010) and Jakobsson and Segerstrom (2012) endogenize the overall pace of technological
change in models with o¤shoring, but not its direction. All of our main results derive from the
endogeneity of the direction of technological change and are thus not shared by these papers
or others in this literature.9
Second, our paper is a contribution to the large literature on the theoretical determinants
of changes in inequality and wages in the United States and other advanced economies. Our
model is closely related to task-based approaches, including Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001),
Autor et al. (2003) and (2008), Costinot and Vogel (2010), and Acemoglu and Autor (2010).
The last paper emphasizes the role of technologies replacing tasks previously performed by
labor and the similar role of o¤shoring in this context, but does not model o¤shoring in detail
and does not consider the interplay between o¤shoring and directed technological change.
Third, our paper builds on and extends models of directed technical change (e.g., Acemoglu,
7These predictions are broadly consistent with the evidence in Sheng and Yang (2012) who nd that process-
ing exports and FDI explain a large fraction of the recent increase in the Chinese college wage premium.
8Some other recent contributions studying the e¤ect of o¤shoring on wages include Antràs et al. (2006),
Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2010), Costinot et al. (2012) and Egger et al. (2012). di Giovanni et al. (2012)
provide a quantitative analysis of the global welfare e¤ect of trade opening and productivity growth in China.
9Goel (2012) studies the e¤ect of o¤shoring on wages of di¤erent workers in a model with capital-skill
complementarity, but without directed technical change.
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1998, 2002, 2007, Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001, Kiley, 1999, Gancia and Zilibotti, 2008), and
especially those linking international trade to the direction of new technologies, including
Acemoglu (2003), Thoenig and Verdier (2003) and Epifani and Gancia (2008). All three
of these papers show how international trade can induce technological changes that further
increase the demand for skills, thus amplifying its direct impact on the wage structure.10 This
literature has not, to the best of our knowledge, considered o¤shoring, which has di¤erent
e¤ects on labor market equilibria and thus on incentives for technical change. These e¤ects
include the impact of o¤shoring on the direction of technical change that is independent of
international intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement (as discussed in footnote 5); the
non-monotonic relationship between o¤shoring and the direction of technical change which
crucially depends on the endogeneity of the gap between wages in the East and the West and
thus the extent of the price e¤ect, features related to the Ricardian nature of intermediate
trade; and the novel result that stronger IPR enforcement, by reducing the cost of o¤shoring,
can trigger skill-biased technical change.11
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model of inter-
mediate/task trade and directed technical change and characterizes the e¤ects of o¤shoring
on wages and skill premia for a given level of technology. Section 3 studies the impact of
o¤shoring on the direction of technical change and wages. Sections 4 and 5 study transitional
dynamics and the welfare e¤ects of a shock to the cost of o¤shoring. Section 6 extends the
model to include o¤shoring of high-skill intermediates and imitation. Section 7 concludes. The
Appendix contains the omitted proofs.
2 Model
2.1 Environment
The world economy comprises of two countries, West and East, populated by two types of
workers, skilled and unskilled, both in xed supply. The West is endowed with Lw units of
unskilled workers and H units of skilled workers. The East is assumed to be skill scarce. In
particular, we assume that the East has Le unskilled workers and has no skilled workers (we
relax this assumption in Section 6). The two countries also di¤er in the technological capa-
bilities to produce existing intermediates (Krugman, 1979): new technologies are introduced
in the West and can be transferred to the East only after paying a xed o¤shoring cost. As
in earlier models of directed technical change (see, e.g, Acemoglu, 2002), some technologies
complement skilled workers while others complement unskilled workers and the evolution of
both is endogenous. There are no barriers to trade of goods across countries, but labor is
10Burstein and Vogel (2012) develop and estimate a model based on the interaction between trade and skill-
biased technologies, but without endogenous or directed technical change.
11The recent paper by Chu et al. (2012) studies the e¤ect of changes in the supply of labor in China on the
direction of innovation in a model of trade and o¤shoring. Their results with o¤shoring mirror those obtained in
models with directed technichal change under full IPR protection (discussed, for example, in Acemoglu, 2003).
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immobile. Variables with no country index refer to the world economy.
Innitely lived households derive utility from the consumption of a unique nal good, and
supply labor inelastically. Preferences are identical across countries and types of workers, and
take a logarithmic form. In consequence, the world economy admits a representative household
with preferences at time t = 0 given by
U =
Z 1
0
e t lnCtdt;
where  > 0 is the discount rate. Logarithmic utility is assumed to simplify the exposition.
The representative household sets a consumption plan to maximize utility, subject to an in-
tertemporal budget constraint and a No-Ponzi game condition. The consumption plan satises
a standard Euler equation,
_Ct=Ct = rt   ; (1)
where rt is the interest rate, as well as a transversality condition which takes the form
lim
t!1

exp

 
Z t
0
rsds

Wt

= 0; (2)
where Wt is the wealth of consumers which, as we will see below, comes from their ownership
of rms in the economy.12 In what follows, time indexes will be omitted in what follows as
long as this causes no confusion.
The nal good, Y; is used for both consumption and investment. The technology to produce
it is represented by a production function featuring constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
between two sectors (where we suppress the distribution parameter of the CES to simplify
notation):
Y =

Y
 1

l + Y
 1

h
 
 1
: (3)
Here Yh and Yl are tradable goods, and  is the elasticity of substitution between them. Choos-
ing Y as the numeraire, prot maximization yields the following inverse demand functions:
Pl = (Y=Yl)
1= and Ph = (Y=Yh)
1= ; (4)
where Pl and Ph are the world prices of Yl and Yh, respectively. Naturally, we also have
Ph=Pl = (Yl=Yh)
1=.13
Production in each of the two sectors requires intermediates, which are in turn manufac-
12 In particular, we will have
Wt =
Z Ah;t
0
Vj;tdi+
Z Al;t
0
Vj;tdj

;
where Vj;t =
R1
t
exp
  R s
t
rs0ds
0 j;sds, j;s is the prots of the rm operating intermediate j in sector
s 2 fl; hg as given by (8) below, and As;t is the range of active intermediates in sector s.
13Since Y is the numeraire, we also have
 
P 1 "l + P
1 "
h
 1
1 " = 1:
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tured by workers. In particular, the production of intermediates used to make Yl and Yh,
require, respectively, unskilled and skilled workers. The production technologies of the two
sectors are represented by the following Dixt-Stiglitz production functions:
Yl = El
Z Al
0
xl;idi
1=
and Yh = Eh
Z Ah
0
xh;idi
1=
; (5)
where xl;i (resp., xh;i) is the quantity of intermediate i 2 [0; Al] (resp., i 2 [0; Ah]), and
  1= (1  ) > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two of them. As in models
of horizontal innovation (e.g., Romer, 1990, see Gancia and Zilibotti, 2005, for a survey), the
measures of intermediates, Al and Ah, represents the state of technology in the two sectors
which grows endogenously over time. The terms
El  (Al)
2 1
 and Eh  (Ah)
2 1
 (6)
are technological spillovers introduced to guarantee that the model has balanced growth prop-
erties for any .14
Prot maximization yields the following inverse demand functions:
pl;i = PlE

l Y
1 
l x
 1
l;i and ph;i = PhE

hY
1 
h x
 1
h;i ; (7)
where pl;i (ph;i) is the price of the intermediate variety i; where i 2 [0; Al] (i 2 [0; Ah]).
Each intermediate is produced by a single monopolist using a constant returns to scale
technology using labor as sole input:
xl;i = li and xh;i = Zhi;
where li (hi) is the quantity of unskilled (skilled) labor employed and Z  1. Since the demand
features a constant elasticity equal to   1= (1  ), prot maximizing rms charge prices
equal to a markup 1= over the the respective marginal cost: ph;i = (wh=Z) = and pl;i =
wl;w=, for varieties produced in the West, and pl;i = wl;e= for varieties produced in the East,
where wh denotes the high-skill wage, and wl;c denotes the low-skill wage in country c 2 fe; wg.
As a result, prots are a fraction (1  ) of the value of sales:
l;i = (1  ) pl;ixl;i and h;i = (1  ) ph;ixh;i: (8)
14Alternative formulation without such spillovers yield identical results, but complicate the algebra, motivating
our choice here. See Gancia and Zilibotti (2009) and Acemoglu, Gancia and Zilibotti (2011) for a more detailed
discussion of this formulation.
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2.2 Equilibrium with Exogenous Technology
In this subsection, we consider the wage e¤ects of o¤shoring for an exogenous level of technology
(Al; Ah).
As in Krugman (1979), we assume that the West can produce the entire measure of existing
intermediates, while the East can only produce a fraction  <   Le=(Le +Lw) < 1 of them.
The restriction that  <  guarantees that wages are lower in the East, so that o¤shoring
production to the East, when technologically feasible, is also protable for Western rms.
This assumption also implies that a rm that can o¤shore will not produce in the West. It
follows that in equilibrium a measure Al of rms produce in the East and the remaining
measure (1  )Al in the West. Note that both the extent of o¤shoring, , and the skill bias
of technology, taken as exogenous here, will be endogenized in the next section (which will also
guarantee that  < ).
Imposing labor market clearing and using the fact that all rms of a given type are identical,
we can solve for the quantity produced of any intermediate in the West and the East as:
xh =
ZHw
Ah
; xl;w =
Lw
(1  )Al and xl;e =
Le
Al
: (9)
Next, using (7), we obtain the East-West low-skill wage gap:
wl;w
wl;e
=
pl;w
pl;e
=

xl;w
xl;e
 1
=

Le
Lw
1  

1 
; (10)
where it is evident that  <  implies that wl;w > wl;e. As production is relocated to the East
(i.e, as  goes up), the demand for unskilled workers falls in the West and increases in the East,
thereby compressing the wage gap. Note that conditional on  the elasticity of substitution
between unskilled workers in the West and East is also   1= (1  ).
Substituting (9) into (5), and using (6), we can express the world production of the low-skill
good as:
Yl = AlL^; (11)
where
L^ 

1 Le + (1  )1  Lw
1=
(12)
is a weighted average of the Easts and the Wests endowments of unskilled workers, with weighs
depending on the o¤shoring rate. As in standard models of horizontal innovation, equation
(11) shows that production increases linearly in the number of existing varieties, Al. More
interestingly, for a given number of varieties, equation (12) shows that production increases in
the extent of o¤shoring:
dL^
d
=
1  

L^1 

Le


 

Lw
1  

> 0;
8
where lim!0 dL^=d = 1 and lim! dL^=d = 0: We refer to this as the e¢ ciency e¤ect of
o¤shoring: an increase in  induces an e¢ ciency-enhancing reallocation of production towards
countries where wages are lower. In terms of the production of Yl, this is equivalent to an
increase in the world factor endowment ranging from L^ = Lw; when  ! 0, to L^ = Lw + Le;
when  ! . Importantly, the e¢ ciency e¤ect is stronger when wages in the East are lower,
i.e., when there is little o¤shoring (low ) and when the East has a large relative endowment
of unskilled workers (high Le=Lw). This is intuitive in view of the fact that the e¢ ciency e¤ect
exploits the wage gap between East and West, which is inversely related to .15
Consider, next, the skill-intensive sector. Substituting into (5) the expression of xh given
in (9) and using (6) yields:
Yh = AhZH: (13)
For future reference, it is useful to rewrite the expression of prots given by (8), using (6),
(7), (9),(11) and (13):
h = (1  )PhH; l;w = (1  )PlL^1 

Lw
1  

; (14)
l;e = (1  )PlL^1 

Le


:
2.3 Offshoring and Wages with Exogenous Technology
We are now in the position to study the e¤ect of the level of o¤shoring on wages in the West.
We consider, rst, the e¤ect of changes in  on the skill premium, and then on the high- and
low-skill wage levels.
Denote the skill premium in the West by !w  wh;w=wl;w. Constant markups then imply
that !w = Z (ph;w=pl;w). Using (4), (7), (9), (11), and (13) we obtain:
!w = Z

Eh
El
 Ph
Pl

Yh
Yl
xl;w
xh;w
1 
=

ZAh
Al
1 1= Lw
1  
1 


H
L^
 1=
 1
L^1 
; (15)
where, recall, L^ is an increasing function of : The rst equation shows that the skill premium
is increasing in the relative price (Ph=Pl) and the relative aggregate demand (Yh=Yl) for skill-
intensive products, and decreasing in relative rm size (xh;w=xl;w). The expression in the
second line shows that the impact of changes in o¤shoring (i.e., an increase in ) on the skill
15To illustrate more formally how the e¢ ciency e¤ect depends on the East-West wage gap, consider the impact
of o¤shoring on the world price of Yl, Pl. Using (5) yields Pl = A 1l
h
p1 l;e + (1  ) p1 l;w
i1=(1 )
, implying
that
@P1 
l
@
= (Al)
 1 (w1 l;e  w1 l;w ): The expression of the derivative shows that relocating production from
the West to the East lowers the production cost of Yl by a factor proportional to the wage gap between the two
countries.
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premium can be decomposed into a labor supply e¤ect, (Lw= (1  ))1 , a relative price e¤ect,
(H=L^) 1=, and an e¢ ciency e¤ect, L^ 1. The rst two e¤ects increase the skill premium,
whereas the third one reduces it.
We now discuss each e¤ect in more detail. First, o¤shoring displaces Western unskilled
workers who must be rehired by the remaining domestic rms. Holding prices (Ph=Pl) con-
stant, this is analogue to an increase in the supply of unskilled workers in the West which
in turn increases the skill premium. Second, o¤shoring increases low-skill production, raising
the relative price of the skill-intensive goods. This relative price e¤ect also increases the skill
premium. Third, o¤shoring raises the overall e¢ ciency of low-skill production, reducing Yh=Yl.
The increase in the relative demand for the unskilled product raises the demand for the o¤-
shored factor in the West. The e¤ect is stronger when the complementarity between unskilled
workers in the West and the East is greater (low ) and when the initial level of o¤shoring is
lower.
An inspection of (15) shows that the e¢ ciency e¤ect is dominated by the price e¤ect when-
ever  >  (i.e., 1    < 1=). That is, if the elasticity of substitution between intermediates
produced in the East and in the West (or between unskilled workers in the East and in the
West) is greater than the elasticity of substitution between high- and low-skill workers, then
o¤shoring necessarily increases the skill premium in the West. Given the estimates of elastic-
ities in the empirical literature, this case seems empirically plausible and will be the one we
emphasize in the rest of the paper.16
If, instead, intermediates were more complementary than high- and low-skill workers ( < 
or 1  > 1=), then the e¢ ciency e¤ect would dominate the price e¤ect. Whether it would also
dominate the labor-supply e¤ect depends on the level of o¤shoring. Since lim!0 dL^=d =1,
for su¢ ciently low levels of , the e¢ ciency e¤ect is so strong that o¤shoring raises the relative
reward to the o¤shored factor. For su¢ ciently high levels of o¤shoring, however, only the
labor-supply e¤ect remains (recall, lim! dL^=d = 0). The relationship between !w and  in
the two cases is depicted in Figure 1.
The e¢ ciency e¤ect is similar to the productivity e¤ect of trade in tasks in Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2008). In their model, o¤shoring requires a per-unit cost which varies across
tasks, there is no substitutability across tasks and the foreign wage is exogenously given. Under
these assumptions, they show that a fall in o¤shoring costs increases the e¤ective productivity
of the o¤shored factor and in some cases its wage. Our results di¤er in three important respects.
16Most estimates of the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers are in the range [1:5; 2]
(e.g., Ciccone and Peri 2005). There is also a large literature estimating substitutability across traded varieties,
including intermediate inputs. The vast majority of these estimates are above 3. For example, on the basis of
existing studies, Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) conclude that this elasticity is likely to be from 5 to 10.
Broda and Weinstein (2006) nd an average import demand elasticity of 4 across three-digit SITC sectors, 12
across ten-digit, HTS sectors. Structural estimates in Eaton et al. (2011) suggests an average elasticity around
3.
A nal argument suggesting that  >  is the plausible case is as follows: when  >  an increase in Le would
reduce the skill premium in the West, which appears implausible and somewhat counterfactual.
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Figure 1: O¤shoring and the Skill Premium. The gure shows the relationship between o¤-
shoring () and the skill premium in the West (!) for the cases  = 1:6;  = 3:33 (solid),
 = 1:11 (dashed). See Section 5 for the remaining parameters.
First, by taking into account the general equilibrium adjustment of Eastern wages to the higher
demand for their services, our model suggests that the e¢ ciency e¤ect becomes endogenously
weaker as more o¤shoring takes place and will eventually vanish once wages have converged
worldwide.
Second, di¤erently from Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), our model allows for substi-
tutability between intermediates, and shows that the extent of such substitution, as captured
by the elasticity of substitution between intermediates, changes the strength of the e¢ ciency
e¤ect. In fact, our results show that assuming no task/intermediate substitutability, as in
several existing models of o¤shoring, might provide only a partial picture of the implications
of o¤shoring.
Third, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) emphasize the benecial e¤ect of a reduction
in the unit cost of o¤shoring on all o¤shored tasks (intensive margin), while we focus on the
benet of o¤shoring additional intermediates and tasks (the extensive margin). In both cases,
the e¢ ciency/productivity e¤ect exists, but its determinants are di¤erent.
In the rest of this section, we study the e¤ect of o¤shoring on wage levels. It is easy to
establish that wages of both high-skill workers and low-skill Eastern workers increase unam-
biguously with o¤shoring (see Proposition 1 and its proof below). The behavior of the wage
of low-skill workers in the West is more complex and deserves some discussion. It is also espe-
cially interesting since the e¤ect of o¤shoring on low-skill wages in the West is the subject of
an intense debate.
In the model with exogenous technology discussed in this section, o¤shoring always reduces
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low-skill wages when the initial level of o¤shoring is high (i.e., as  ! ). But its impact at
low initial level of o¤shoring is ambiguous. More formally, the low-skill wage is given by
wl;w = pl;w = PlE

l (Yl=xl;i)
1 : Using (3), (4), (6), (9), (11) and (13) yields:
wl;w = 
 
1 +

Ah
Al
ZH
L^
  1

! 1
 1
AlL^1  

1  
Lw
1 
: (16)
The e¤ect of  on wl;w can again be decomposed into a relative price e¤ect, an e¢ ciency e¤ect
and a labor supply e¤ect. The interpretation is similar to the discussion above concerning the
skill premium: o¤shoring decreases the low-skill wage via the price and labor supply e¤ects,
whereas it increases wl;w via the e¢ ciency e¤ect.
Standard algebra (see the proof of Proposition 1 below) establishes that an increase in 
necessarily lowers wl;w when (i)  >  (i.e., 1   < 1=) and (ii)
!w
H
Lw
>

    : (17)
We have argued above that  >  is the empirically relevant case. Condition (17) is also
plausible. For example, in the US economy the ratio of college to high-school graduates is
greater than one and the skill premium greater than 1.5. With !wH=Lw = 1:5 and  = 1:6,
o¤shoring necessarily lowers the real wage of unskilled workers in the West whenever the
elasticity of substitution across varieties is greater than 2:66, a value comfortably below the
empirical estimates in the trade literature (see footnote 16). Thus, under two conditions that
we regard as empirically realistic, low-skill wages are uniformly decreasing with o¤shoring.
The relationship between o¤shoring and the three wage levels is depicted in Figure 2 for the
relatively conservative case  = 1:6 and  = 3:33.
When either  <  or condition (17) is reversed, then the relationship between o¤shoring
and low-skill wages is hump shaped. In particular, as  ! ; dL^=d ! 0; both the price
and the e¢ ciency e¤ects vanish, and dwl;w=d < 0; unambiguously. However, as  ! 0,
dL^=d!1; and the sign of the total e¤ect turns positive.
The next proposition summarizes the impact of o¤shoring with exogenous technology on
the skill premium in the West and wages in the West and the East (proof in the Appendix).
Proposition 1 With exogenous technology, an increase in o¤shoring, parameterized by :
 increases the skill premium, !w, if  >  (i.e., if the elasticity of substitution between
intermediates is greater than the elasticity of substitution between skills);
decreases the skill premium, !w, for low initial values of  and increases the skill premium
for high initial values of  if  < ;
 increases the real wage of skilled workers in the West, wh;w, and the real wage of unskilled
workers in the East, wl;e;
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Figure 2: O¤shoring and Wages. The gure shows the relationship between o¤shoring () and
wage levels, wh;w (red), wl;w (solid) and wl;e (dashed), for the case  = 1:6 and  = 3:3: See
Section 5 for the remaining parameters.
 decreases the real wage of unskilled workers in the West, wl;w; if  >  and !wHw=Lw >
=(   ); where !w is given by (15). Otherwise, its impact on wl;w is hump-shaped: it
increases wl;w for low initial values of , and decreases wl;w for high initial values of :
In the rest of the paper, we characterize the e¤ects of o¤shoring opportunities on technology.
Our analysis characterizes these e¤ects for all values of the various elasticities of substitution,
but in light of the discussion above, we emphasize the empirically relevant case where  > .
3 Endogenous Offshoring and Technology
In this section, we endogenize technical change and o¤shoring, focusing on balanced growth
paths (BGP). Transitional dynamics will be studied in the next section.
We assume that innovation is subject to a xed cost ; assumed for simplicity to be the
same in both the high- and low-skill sector. In addition, by paying an additional set-up cost,
f , a rm has the option to o¤shore the production of its variety to a partner rm in the East.
However, in this case the Western rm only appropriates a share ~  1 of the prot ow (all our
results apply when ~ = 1). This can be motivated by a variety of contractual imperfections,
for example by assuming that the o¤shoring rm is subject to a hold up problem forcing it
to transfer part of its prots to a partner company in the East or has only imperfect IPR
protection.
Let Vh be the value of a skill-intensive rm. This value must satisfy the usual Hamilton-
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Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:
rVh = h + _Vh: (18)
In words, the instantaneous return from owning the rms is equal to the prot rate plus any
capital gain or losses. Similarly, let V ol be the value of a rm that has paid the o¤shoring
cost, and Vl the value of a low-skill rm that produces in the West. These value functions are
determined by the following HJB equations:
rV ol = maxfl;w; ~l;eg+ _V ol ; (19)
rVl = max
n
l;w + _Vl; r(V
o
l   f)
o
:
The max operator in the rst HJB equation takes into account the fact that the rm will
produce in the most protable location. Typically, a rm that has paid the o¤shoring cost
will nd optimal to produce in the East, thus, ~l;e > l;w: The max operator in the second
HJB equation captures the option for the non-o¤shored rm to pay the cost f; o¤shore its
production, and change its value to V ol .
Free-entry implies that the value of introducing a new intermediate and the value of
o¤shoring the production of an existing intermediate cannot exceed their respective costs:
V ol   Vl  f; Vl  ; and Vh  : In a BGP with positive innovation and o¤shoring, all
free-entry conditions must hold as equalities, so that
Vl = Vh = , and V
o
l = f + : (20)
These conditions, together with the HJB equations above, pin down the BGP interest rate:
r =
~l;e   l;w
f
=
l;w

=
h

: (21)
As we now show, this equation, which requires the return from o¤shoring and from any in-
novations to be equalized, determines the BGP level of o¤shoring () and the skill-bias of
technology (Ah=Al).
To nd the BGP level of o¤shoring, let us dene   ~=(f=+1), which varies between zero
and one, and can be interpreted as an index of o¤shoring opportunities. The rst equality
in (21) implies that l;e = l;w. Substituting in the expressions of prots given by (14) yields
the BGP level of o¤shoring as a function of :
 =

1 +  1=Lw=Le
 1
: (22)
Intuitively, better IPR (~) and lower o¤shoring costs (f), i.e., a higher , and a greater supply
of labor in the East (Le) make o¤shoring more attractive.
Substituting (22) into (10) and (12) yields the BGP East-West wage gap and the e¤ective
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world labor supply of unskilled workers:
wl;w
wl;e
= 
 1
 and L^ =
0B@ (1 )=Le + Lw
Lw + 
1=Le
1 
1CA
1=
:
To determine the direction of technical change, we next turn to the relative BGP value
of innovation in the two sectors. First note that (18), (19) and (20) together imply that
Vh=Vl = h=l. Then, substituting prots from (14) yields:
Vh
Vl
=
Ph
Pl
 ZHw
L^1 

Lw
1 
 =
 
AlL^
AhHw
!1=
 ZHw
L^1 

Lw
1 
 ; (23)
where the last equality follows by substituting for Ph=Pl from (4) and then using (11) and (13).
As in the canonical model of directed technical change (e.g., Acemoglu, 2002), the relative value
for new innovations depends on a price and on a market size e¤ect. However, the market size
e¤ect here takes a novel form: while the market size for skill-complementary innovations is
simply H, the e¤ective market size in the other sector depends on Lw, Le and the extent of
o¤shoring, .
Consider now the e¤ect of an increase in  (which also increases ) on the direction of
technical change to illustrate these price and market size e¤ects. First, the improvement in
the allocation of labor worldwide leads (via an increase in L^) to an increase in the production
of the low-skill good, Yl. This raises the relative price of the high-skill good and increases the
relative protability of high-skill innovation. In other words, it induces a price e¤ect favoring
skill biased technologies. Second, the increase in  also triggers two di¤erent types of market
size e¤ects. On the one hand, as more tasks and sectors are o¤shored to the East, each low-
skill intermediate still produced in the US employs more workers and is produced in greater
quantity. We refer to this e¤ect, which favors unskill-biased technologies in response to greater
o¤shoring, as a direct market size e¤ect. This e¤ect is captured in (23) by the term Lw1  and is
clearly increasing in  and thus in . On the other hand, an increase in  also raises L^, raising
the total market size of unskill-biased technologies. Intuitively, the market size depends (for
given prices of the nal goods and the size of the production of each rm in the US) on how
e¢ ciently the labor force is allocated worldwide. Increasing the e¢ ciency of the allocation
yields a larger e¤ective market size. The extent of the complementarity across intermediates
is crucial for this e¤ect. As ! 1, the intermediates are perfect substitutes, and the e¤ective
market size becomes independent of L^: Conversely, this e¤ect is maximized when  is small,
and intermediates are highly complementary. We refer to this novel e¤ect as a complementary
market size e¤ect.
Imposing the BGP technology market clearing condition, Vl = Vh, into (23) yields the BGP
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Figure 3: O¤shoring and Directed Technical Change. The gure shows the relationship between
o¤shoring () and Ah=Al for the case  = 1:6;  = 5 (dashed) and  = 3:33 (solid). See Section
5 for the remaining parameters.
ratio of technologies:
Ah
Al
= (ZHw)
 1 L^1 +

1  
Lw

; (24)
where
d ln (Ah=Al)
d
=
"
(1  + ) d ln L^
d
  
1  
#
d
d
: (25)
When  > , (25) is positive for small values of , because in this case the price e¤ect is
strong and the market size e¤ect is limited (recall that d ln L^=d ! 1 as  ! 0). It turns
negative for high values of  because now the direct market size e¤ect is more pronounced
(recall that d ln L^=d ! 0 as  ! ). We dene, for future reference, the threshold value ^
such that, at this threshold, (25) is equal to zero (recall that  is monotonically increasing in
) as:
^ =  1

2
(1  + ) (1  )

; (26)
where  ()  (L^ ())   ( ())  Le   (1   ())  Lw (1   ()) ; which is monotonically
decreasing in : Intuitively, ^ is the threshold value of  such that, if  < ^ (resp.,   ^),
then d (Ah=Al) =d > 0 (resp., d (Ah=Al) =d  0). Note that a lower  strengthens the price
e¤ect, which tends to induce skill-biased technical change, and thus implies a higher ^. The
relationship between the BGP level of Ah=Al and  for the case  >  and two plausible values
of  is represented in Figure 3.
To better understand the intuition for the hump-shaped pattern of Figure 3, recall that, as
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discussed above, the e¤ect of an increase of  on L^ becomes very large as ! 0, and vanishes
as ! : Since the direct market size e¤ect does not vanish as ! ; it dominates all other
e¤ects when  is large. This guarantees that a reduction in o¤shoring costs leads unambiguously
to unskill-bias technical change (UBTC) when  is large (su¢ ciently close to ). When  is
small, we have the converse situation where the direct market size e¤ect becomes negligible
relative to the e¤ects operating through L^ (i.e., the price e¤ect and the complementary market
size e¤ect). However, since these two e¤ects work in opposite directions, their net impact is
still ambiguous. When  > , as shown in the gure, the price e¤ect is large and dominates
the complementary market size e¤ect. In this case, the increase in o¤shoring (or o¤shoring
opportunities) generates a race between the price e¤ect (net of the complementary market
size e¤ect) that pulls towards skill-biased technical change (SBTC) and the direct market
size e¤ect that pushes towards UBTC. When wages in the East are low, the e¤ect of more
o¤shoring opportunities is a large increase in the aggregate production of low-skill goods (Yl),
causing a signicant increase in the relative price of high-skill good. Thus o¤shoring induces
SBTC in this case. On the contrary, when wages in the East are already high, the e¤ect of
o¤shoring opportunities on Yl is limited, and is dominated by the fact that each low-skill rm
in the US employs more workers and serves a larger market. Thus, over this range, o¤shoring
induces UBTC. This pattern contrasts with the case where  < , which involves the price
e¤ect being dominated by the complementary market size e¤ect. In this case, an increase
in  unambiguously induces UBTC. As Figure 3 shows, the e¤ect of o¤shoring on the skill
bias of technology can be signicant, particularly when the elasticity of substitution between
intermediates is high (dashed line).
It is useful to compare these results with those obtained in models focusing on the impact
of trade on the direction of technological progress, such as Acemoglu (2003), Acemoglu and
Zilibotti (2001) and Gancia, Muller and Zilibotti (2011). In those models, the equation for the
relative protability of skill-complement innovations, (23), simplies to:
Vh
Vl
=
h
l
=
Ph
Pl
ZH
L
;
where H and L are the relevant endowments. This corresponds to the autarky equilibrium in
the present model. The e¤ect of trade integration on the relative protability of high- and
low-skill innovation depends then on assumptions about the total skill endowment in the free-
trade equilibrium and the extent of international protection of Intellectual Property Rights
(IPR). Consider the opening to trade of a large skill-scarce country. Without global IPR, the
market size for new technologies does not change. Then, the only e¤ect will be an increase in
the world price of skill-intensive products (Ph=Pl), which will induce SBTC. With global IPR
protection, the market size dominates the price e¤ect and the larger endowment of unskilled
workers in the world economy would make it protable to invest in UBTC. When  > , our
model of o¤shoring nests these two extreme scenarios and predicts an endogenous switch from
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SBTC to UBTC as integration increases. The reason is that the relative strength of the price
e¤ect varies with the level of o¤shoring: it dominates when wages in the East are low and the
e¢ ciency e¤ect is strong, but it disappears as more o¤shoring eliminates the cost di¤erences
between the East and the West.
What are the implications for the skill premium in the West? Substituting (24) into (15),
we can nd the BGP skill premium as:
!w = Z
 1H 2w L^
1 +

Lw
1  
1 
: (27)
In the extreme cases of prohibitive o¤shoring costs (implying  = 0) and zero o¤shoring costs
(implying  = ), the skill premium is a function of the relative endowment of skilled labor in
the West and in the entire world, respectively:
!w j=0= Z 1

H
Lw
 2
; !w j=1= Z 1

H
Lw + Le
 2
:
As in standard models of directed technical change (e.g., Acemoglu, 2002), the relationship
between the skill premium and the relative supply of skill is increasing whenever  > 2. In
intermediate cases where  2 (0; 1), the e¤ect of o¤shoring on the skill premium is generally
non-monotonic and depends crucially on  and . This can be seen by di¤erentiating (27) with
respect to :
d ln!w
d
=
"
(1  + ) @ ln L^
@
+
1  
1  
#
@
@
: (28)
For low levels of o¤shoring, the e¢ ciency e¤ect (L^) is the dominant force. Focusing again on
the case  > , the skill premium will increase with  for two reason. The rst is the static
e¤ect presented in the previous section. The second reason is the induced SBTC which we have
just discussed. For high levels of o¤shoring ( ! 1), however, the e¢ ciency e¤ect disappears
(d ln L^d = 0) and UBTC tends to lower wage inequality. Equation (28) then shows that the skill
premium will fall with  whenever  >  1 (i.e.,  >
1
). This implies that when

 1 <  < 
(i.e., 1 <  <
1
1 ), the long-run relationship between !w and  is inverse U-shaped. Note also
that this outcome is more likely when substitutability between L-complement intermediates is
high (i.e., high ). If the elasticity of substitution between varieties, , is equal to 5 (which is
in the ballpark of the elasticities of substitution across intermediates in the trade literature, see
footnote 16), the inverted U-shape holds for  2 (1:25; 5), which includes the range of consensus
estimates of the elasticity of substitution between skill groups. The same conclusion continues
to apply even with a conservative value of  = 3, which implies the inverted U-shape applies
for  2 (1:5; 2:9) :17
17 In contrast, if  were lower than 0.5 ( < 2), the opposite case could also arise: if 1

>  > 1
1  , then
the relationship between !w and  would be U-shaped instead of inverted U-shaped. However, the parameter
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Figure 4: O¤shoring and the Skill Premium. The gure shows the relationship between o¤-
shoring () and the skill premium in the West (!) for endogenous technology (solid) and
exogenous technology (dashed). The main parameters are  = 1:6;  = 3:33 and the others are
described in Section 5.
Figure 4 shows the relationship between the skill premium and o¤shoring for  = 1:6 and
 = 3:33. The monotonic schedule (dased line) is obtained by holding technology constant
at the autarky level, while the black line represents the BGP skill premium with endogenous
skill bias. As the gure makes clear, the endogenous reaction of technology provides a strong
amplication of the impact of o¤shoring on the skill premium for low levels of integration,
while this e¤ect is reverted for high levels of o¤shoring.18 Thus, the combination of o¤shoring
together with directed technical change can explain a large surge in the skill premium even for
low levels of trade between the West and the East.
Finally, let us turn to the e¤ect of o¤shoring on innovation and growth in the long run.
The Euler equation for consumption, g = r   ; links the BGP interest rate and growth rate.
The interest rate is uniquely pinned down by the free-entry condition for innovation, r = h=.
Substituting for h from (14) and using (3), (4), (11), (13) and (22) yields:
r =
1  

h
L^1 

Lw + 
1=Le
i 1
+ (ZHw)
 1
 1
 1
: (29)
Since dL^=d > 0, an increase in o¤shoring opportunities () increases the BGP interest rate
and thus the BGP growth rate. Usual arguments then establish that consumption, Y , Yh,
condition for this to be the case does not seem very realistic.
18The pattern presented in Figure 3 also suggests that the amplication e¤ect would be even stronger for
higher, but still plausible, values of .
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Yl, Ah and Al all grow at the common rate g, which is strictly positive provided that  <
min fLw; ZHwg.19
The next proposition summarizes the main results of this section (proof in the text).
Proposition 2 Suppose  >  > 1 and  < min fLw; ZHwg. Then there exists a unique
BGP with growth g > 0. In this BGP, an increase in o¤shoring opportunities, parameterized
by :
 increases the o¤shoring rate, ;
 increases the equilibrium interest rate, r, and the growth rate, g;
 induces a hump-shaped response in the skill bias of technology [i.e., it induces SBTC, or
higher Ah=Al, for low initial , and UBTC, or lower Ah=Al, for high initial ];
 increases the skill premium, !w, if  1 > , and induces a hump-shaped reaction in the
skill premium, !w, if  >  1 [i.e., it increases !w for low initial , and decreases !w
for high initial ];
 reduces the wage gap between unskilled workers in the East and in the West, wl;e=wl;w.
This proposition thus summarizes the rich pattern of interactions between o¤shoring and
the endogenous direction of technology. Greater o¤shoring opportunities rst induce SBTC
and tend to raise wage inequality, but will ultimately induce UBTC and, in this case, will
limit or even reduce inequality. Figure 4 above, which also plots the relationship between
o¤shoring and wage inequality with endogenous technology, illustrates that the non-monotonic
relationship is indeed driven by the endogenous response of technology.
Proposition 2 is stated under the assumption that  >  which we argued above to be the
empirically relevant case. For completeness, we state the analogous results in Proposition 4 for
the case of  <  in the Appendix. As discussed in the text, the main di¤erences are that, in the
low- case, an increase in o¤shoring opportunities necessarily induces UBTC, and generates
either a U-shaped response or a monotonically decreasing response in the skill premium
4 Transitional Dynamics
In this section, we consider the implications of a small (unexpected) increase in o¤shoring
opportunities (henceforth, an o¤shoring shock) on the entire equilibrium path of the economy.
19Since in BGP, Vl = Vh =  and V ol = + f (from (20)), the transversality condition (2) becomes
lim
t!1

exp

 
Z t
0
rsds

(Ah;t+Al;t (+ f))

= 0:
As Al and Ah grow at the rate g, and r =  + g > g, this is automatically satised in the unique candidate
BGP.
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To simplify the discussion, we assume that before the shock the economy is in the BGP. The
shock may be caused by either an increase in ~ or a decrease in f: This shock increases the BGP
o¤shoring rate, ; and also impacts the skill bias of technology as indicated in Proposition 2.
The next proposition characterizes the transitional dynamics of , Ah and Al: A formal proof
and a complete characterization of the dynamical system is provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 Suppose  > , the economy is initially in the pre-shock BGP, and there is
a (positive) o¤shoring shock at time t = 0. Then, the dynamic equilibrium path converges in
nite time to a new BGP with a higher o¤shoring rate. Moreover:
(i) If  < ^ (where ^ dened in (26)), then the o¤shoring shock induces a two-stage transition
whereby, for some T and ~T such that 0 < T < ~T < 1; we have: (stage 1) _t > 0; _Al;t =
_Ah;t = 0 for all t 2 [0; T ]; (stage 2, SBTC) _t > 0; _Ah;t > 0, and _Al;t = 0 for all t 2 [T; ~T ]:
The economy attains the new BGP at t = ~T : In new BGP, the technology is more skill biased,
i.e., Ah=Al is higher, than in the initial BGP.
(ii) If  > ^, then the o¤shoring shock induces a two-stage transition such that for some T
and ~T (0 < T < ~T < 1), we have: (stage 1) _t > 0; _Al;t = _Ah;t = 0 for all t 2 [0; T ]; (stage
2, UBTC) _t = 0; _Ah;t = 0, and _Al;t > 0 for all t 2 [T; ~T ]: The economy attains the new BGP
at t = ~T : In the new BGP, the technology is less skill biased, i.e., Ah=Al is lower, than in the
initial BGP.
Upon impact, the increase in  triggers a wave of o¤shoring investments, which in turn
causes a discrete increase in the interest rate. The initial stage of the transition which goes on
over to interval [0; T ] (stage 1) features a continuous increase in  (hence, V ol   Vl = f) but
no innovation. The intuition for why innovation is temporarily paused is as follows: o¤shoring
opportunities cause the interest rate to jump up, and at this higher interest rate, we have both
Vh <  and Vl < , making innovation unprotable. Nevertheless, the increasing o¤shoring
rate ultimately restores the protability of innovation, so that either Vh   or Vl   starts
holding again with equality, at which point innovation restarts.
Which type of innovation is restored at this point depends on the initial . As discussed
above, if o¤shoring was initially low (i.e., if  < ^), the price e¤ect dominates the market size
e¤ect, and the shock triggers SBTC.20 More formally, in the second stage of the transition
we have V ol   Vl = f; Vh =  and Vl < ; and consequently, there is both o¤shoring and
high-skill innovation, but no low-skill innovation. Over time, the price adjustment reduces
the gap between h and l, and the economy eventually attains the new BGP where low-skill
innovation is also restored. On the contrary, if o¤shoring was initially high ( > ^), the market
size e¤ect dominates the price e¤ect, and the shock triggers UBTC in the second stage of the
transition (more formally, V ol   Vl = f; Vl =  and Vh < ): Note that in this case  reaches
20The proposition discusses the e¤ect of small changes in : When  < ^, a large increase in  could take us
above ^ and would thus have ambiguous e¤ects (in particular due to the inverse-U shaped relationship between
 and Ah=Al as shown in equation (24)).
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the new BGP level already at the end of the rst stage of the transition. During stage 2,
o¤shoring continuous but the o¤shoring rate, , remains constant.
Changes in the o¤shoring rate and technology a¤ect wages in both the West and the East.
During the rst stage, characterized by no innovation and a steep increase in o¤shoring, the
wage di¤erential between low-skill workers in the West and East shrinks. The absolute level
of the low-skill wage in the West also typically falls during this stage.21 The wage of skilled
workers, instead, goes up. During the second stage, the wage dynamics depend on the nature
of technical change as described in Proposition 2.
TT0
time
2 .99
3 .16
3 .69
high skill wage
Panel a: SBTC
TT0
time
3 .77
3 .84
4 .00
high skill wage
Panel b: UBTC
TT0
time
1 .58
1 .55
1 .60
low skill wage West
TT0
time
1 .39
1 .34
1 .46
low skill wage West
TT0
time
0 .25
0 .33
0 .35
low skill wage East
TT0
time
0 .70
0 .75
0 .82
low skill wage East
Figure 5: Transitional dynamics after an increase in . The gure shows the response of
high-skill wages (top), low-skill wages in the West (medium) and low-skill wages in the East
(bottom). Panel a, on the left, shows the response of wages to a shock that induces SBTC (low
initial ). Panel b, on the right, shows the response of wages to a shock that induces UBTC
(high initial ). Dashed lines show the corresponding no-shock counterfactual.
Figure 5 shows the transitional dynamics of wages in two numerical cases corresponding
to low (Panel a) and high (Panel b) initial o¤shoring, respectively.22 In particular, it shows
21 In principle, there may exist a range of initially low o¤shoring such that all wages in the West increase
as o¤shoring increases. However, when condition (17) is satised, o¤shoring decreases the low-skill wage at all
initial levels of o¤shoring.
22The parameter choices for these gures are discussed in the next section below.
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how the wages of the di¤erent types of workers (from top to bottom, high- and low-skill in
the West, and low-skill workers in the East) evolve over time during the transition relative to
the counterfactual wage dynamics under no shock (dashed lines). The high-skill wage is in
both cases higher than in the no-shock counterfactual throughout the whole transition. The
low-skill wage in the West exhibits, in both cases, a U-shaped transitional dynamics. In Panel
a where the second stage of the transition (t 2 [T; ~T ]) is characterized by SBTC, the low-skill
wage remains below the no-shock counterfactual throughout the whole transition. In Panel b
where the second stage is characterized by UBTC, it surpasses the no-shock counterfactual at
the end of the transition. Finally, the low-skill wage in the East is signicantly higher with
the o¤shoring shock than without.
In all cases we know from Proposition 2 that the new BGP has a higher growth rate, and
this implies that all workers will earn higher wages in a su¢ ciently far future. In consequence,
low-skill workers in the West may face a trade-o¤ between short-run wage losses and long-run
wage gains. The welfare consequences of the increase in o¤shoring and the resolution of this
trade-o¤ are discussed in the next section.
5 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we study the welfare e¤ects of the o¤shoring shock discussed in the previous
section. We compute the discounted utility of di¤erent types of agents. Using the Euler
equation (1), agent is discounted utility evaluated at time t = 0 can be written as:
Ui;0 =
Z 1
0
e t lnCi;tdt =
lnCi;0

+
Z 1
0
e t
Z t
0
rsds  t

dt: (30)
The initial consumption, Ci;0, can be found by combining the Euler equation and the lifetime
budget constraint:
Ci;0 = 
Z 1
0
wi;t exp

 
Z t
0
rsds

dt+ ai;0

;
where wi;t is agent is wage and ai;0 is the value of his asset holdings at t = 0. The welfare e¤ect
of the o¤shoring shock can be decomposed into an impact e¤ect, i.e., the instantaneous jump
in the level of consumption Ci;0, and a growth e¤ect, including both the e¤ect of the change
in the growth rate during transition and on the new BGP. The o¤shoring shock a¤ects Ci;0 by
changing both the present value of wages and the value of the initial assets. To understand
the latter, note that the only assets in positive net supply in the economy are claims to the
prot ow of existing rms. The present value of rm j evaluated at time t = 0 is given by:
Vj;0 =
Z 1
0
exp

 
Z t
0
rsds

j;tdt:
Along a BGP, Vj;0 = . However, during the rst stage of the transition where there is only
o¤shoring and no innovation, we have Vj;0 < , and so the o¤shoring shock causes a capital
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loss to asset owners by increasing the world interest rate.
In the no-shock counterfactual, discounted utility at t = 0 along the old BGP would instead
be given by Ui;0 = (lnC

i;0 + g

0=)=; where C

i;0 = w

i;t + a

i;0 and starred variables denote
BGP values assuming no o¤shoring shock.
Since there are no closed form solutions for the transitional wage and interest rate trajecto-
ries, in this section we rely on numerical analysis.23 We calibrate the model economy so as to
be broadly consistent with some salient facts of the recent development of the global economy.
We identify the West with the US and the East with China, the two largest economies among
the industrializing and emerging markets as well as the most important actors in the process
of globalization and technology o¤shoring. We normalize the size of the unskilled labor in the
West to Lw = 1. The labor force of China is set to Le = 4:7; to match the average relative size
of the Chinese urban labor force over the last decade.24
We set Hw = 1:2 so as to match the relative skill endowment (as measured by the share of
workers with college degree or more) in the US in 2000. We set the elasticity of substitution
between high- and low-skill workers to  = 1:6, consistent with the estimates reported by
Ciccone and Peri (2005). Since the overwhelming majority of estimates of the elasticity of
substitution between traded goods is greater than 3 (see footnote 16), we consider two possible
values for this parameter:  = 3:33 (corresponding to  = 0:7) and  = 5 (corresponding
to  = 0:8). Crucially, in both cases, we have  >  >  1 ; so the BGP responses of the
skill premium to  is hump-shaped (see Proposition 2). Finally, we set  = 0:04 which,
when combined with a 2% long-run growth rate, implies a rate of return on equity about 6%,
which is in the ballpark of the return on equity in post-war US. The initial o¤shoring cost
parameter, f , and the parameter Z are set to match, respectively, the PPP-adjusted wage gap
between Chinese and low skill US workers (wl;e=wl;w = 0:16), and the skill premium in the US
(!w = 1:9) in year 2000.25 This yields 0 = 0:01 and Z = 1:65 in the case of  = 0:7; and
0 = 0:0005 and Z = 1:49 in the case of  = 0:8: In order to generate the wage gap between the
US and China, the model requires signicant technological di¤erences, which in the context of
our model implies high o¤shoring costs (since o¤shoring closes the technology di¤erences).
The innovation cost, ; is chosen to ensure that the post-shock equilibrium annual BGP
23Unless otherwise stated, the calibration described in this section was also used to produce all the gures in
the paper.
24The average size of the unskilled US labor force is 61 millions. This is derived from the total number
of non-agricultural workers in the US, which is 135 millions (source: Current Population Survey). Of these,
61 millions are classied as unskilled (high school graduates or less) and 74 millions are classied as skilled
(some college or more) workers. The average number of urban workers in China over the last decade is 286
millions (source: China Statistial Yearbook). Consistent with the model, we make the simplifying assumption
that all Chinese workers are employed in the low-skill sector (see the next section for a generalization where we
allow o¤shoring to the high-skill sector).
25The wage gap is calculated using the ratio between the average wage in the US and the average urban wage
in China (from the China Statistical Yearbook). This is adjusted to yield the ratio between the average Chinese
urban wage and the low skill wage in the US (own calculation). The PPP is from the Penn World Table. The
US skill premium is from Acemoglu and Autor (2010).
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growth rate is equal to the average growth rate of the US economy between 1950 and 2010,
approximately 2%. Motivated by the recent slowdown in the world growth rates, we also
consider an alternative low-growth scenario where  is larger and consistent with a 1% annual
growth rate, close to the average growth rate of the US economy between 1995 and 2010 (all
growth rates from the Penn World Table 7.1).
Finally, welfare e¤ects also depend on the initial asset distribution. Since observing the
exact asset holdings of di¤erent types of workers is challenging, for this exercise we assume that
the initial share of world assets held by each group of workers is proportional to the present
value of their wages in the initial BGP. This assumption implies that before the o¤shoring
shock high- and low-skill workers in the West own, respectively, 56.5% and 24.8% of the world
assets, while Chinese workers own 18.6% of world assets. For simplicity, we also set ~ = 1 (full
IPR protection) so that we do not have to consider prot stealing, and let the o¤shoring shock
take the form of a reduction in f .
The size of the o¤shoring shock is chosen to generate an increase in the skill premium in
the West comparable to the empirical observation for the US between 2000-08.26 Consistent
with the results in Proposition 3, with both  = 0:7 and  = 0:8, the transitional dynamics
feature a pure o¤shoring stage followed by a stage in which there is SBTC.
In Table 1, we report the e¤ect of the o¤shoring shock on the relative wage in China
(wl;e=wl;w), the growth rate (g) and on welfare of all workers, expressed as the equivalent
change in their level of consumption in the old BGP (ch;w, c

l;w and c

l;e). The rst four
columns refer to the case of  = 0:7, and show that the e¤ect of the increase in o¤shoring on
wages in China is quite signicant. In all four cases, wage of Chinese workers relative to US
unskilled workers grows from the initial level of 0.16 to 0.22. This is approximately 43% of the
catch-up observed between 2000 and 2008, indicating that, according to our model, o¤shoring
of Western technology to China accounts for close to half of Chinese wage growth during this
recent period.
In column (1) we consider the benchmark 2% growth scenario, in which o¤shoring increases
the BGP growth rate of the world economy from 1.8% to 2%. The last three rows of the table
show that the shock has important distributional e¤ects.27 In particular, Chinese workers gain
considerably (+32%), followed by the skilled workers in the US (+10%). Unskilled workers in
the West also gain, but only a modest +1.8%. In column (2) we consider the same experiment
in the alternative low-growth scenario where o¤shoring increases the BGP growth rate of
the world economy from 0.83% to 1%. In this case, all welfare gains are smaller and unskilled
26Note that in order to focus on the implications of changes in o¤shoring in a transparent manner, we keep
the relative supply of skilled workers constant in our simulations. Over the last decade the average educational
attainment of the US labor force has grown from to Hw=Lw = 1:2 in 2000 to 1:37 in 2008, and there has been
an increase in the skill premium from 1.9 to 2. We rst compute, given our elasticity estimates, what the
skill premium would have been had Hw=Lw remained at 1:2, which is !w = 2:1. We then choose the value of
o¤shoring shock such that the skill premium increases to 2.1.
27We refer to these as distributional e¤ectssince the ctitious world representative consumer would always
benet from increased o¤shoring.
25
workers in the US start to lose out. The fact that gains are smaller when the growth potential of
the world economy is lower is a reection of the long-run complementarity between innovation
and o¤shoring we mentioned in the introduction. Recall that o¤shoring increases the BGP
growth rate, and in addition, a high innovation potential speeds up the transition so that the
long-run benets from o¤shoring materialize faster.
The welfare results highlighted thus far are partly driven by the e¤ect of o¤shoring on
growth, which is arguably unrealistic. In columns (3) and (4), we neutralize the growth e¤ect
by changing simultaneously the cost of o¤shoring (f) and of innovation () so as to keep
the BGP growth rate constant before and after the shock. This strategy can be viewed as
a way to isolate the redistributional e¤ects of technology, which is the main focus of the
paper, while remaining agnostic on the determinants of long-run growth. It also captures
the essence of models of semi-endogenous growth (e.g., Jones, 1995), as well as of recent
models suggesting that o¤shoring may directly increase innovation costs due to, for example,
coordination problems (as in Naghavi and Ottaviano, 2009). As columns (3) and (4) show,
once growth e¤ects are neutralized, the welfare gains of all agents are reduced, and can turn
into signicant losses for the unskilled workers in the US (-2.3% and -3.21% in the high- and
low-growth scenarios respectively).
Columns (5)-(8) replicate the same exercises for the case  = 0:8. Overall, the results are
very similar, although the e¤ect of the shock on Chinese wages and welfare is slightly smaller
(the wage gap of China increases from 0.16 to 0.21). As in the previous case, the Chinese
gain the most, the US skilled workers also experience positive welfare gains, ranging from +7%
in the most pessimistic scenario (low growth without growth e¤ects) to +10.4% in the most
optimistic scenario (high growth with growth e¤ects), while unskilled workers in the US gain
(marginally) only in the most optimistic scenario.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 = 3.33 ( = 0.7)  = 5 ( = 0.8)
growth level high low high low high low high low
growth e¤ect yes yes no no yes yes no no
wl;e=wl;w jt=0 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
wl;e=wl;w jt= ~T 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
g0 1.8% 0.83% 2% 1% 1,91% 0.93% 2% 1%
g ~T 2% 1% 2% 1% 2% 1% 2% 1%
ch;w 10.60% 8.20% 6.14% 4.81% 10.38% 8.70% 8.28% 7.06%
cl;w 1.80% -0.06% -2.32% -3.21% 0.51% -0.74% -1.40% -2.24%
cl;e 32% 28.30% 26.63% 24.25% 28.13% 25.60% 25.70% 23.70%
Notes: shock calibrated to generate a change in the skill premium from 1.9 to 2.11
Table 1: Welfare E¤ects, 2000-08
We complete this section by presenting additional numerical simulations starting from
higher levels of o¤shoring, i.e., higher levels of 0. The goal of this exercise is to explore the
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implications of the model in a wider range of parameters not to claim that these scenarios
are relevant for what the world economy has so far experienced. Nevertheless, if o¤shoring
continues to grow, these scenarios might become relevant for the future evolution of the global
economy. We focus on the benchmark calibration for  = 0:7; and change the initial o¤shoring
rate, 0, which yields a higher relative wage in China (28%, 40%, 50% and 60% of the unskilled
wage in the US). In each experiment, the o¤shoring shock is chosen so as to generate an increase
in the Chinese wage of 6 percentage points relative to the corresponding level in the US (i.e.,
to 34%, 46%, 56% and 66%), as it was the case in Table 1. Finally, for the reasons discussed
above and to improve comparability across experiments, we neutralize any growth e¤ect of
o¤shoring by changing the cost of innovation so as to keep g = 2%.
Table 2 reports the results of this exercise. It depicts the direction of technological progress
along the transition (SBTC or UBTC), the Chinese wage gap (wl;e=wl;w) and the skill premium
(!w) both before and after the transition, and the welfare e¤ect for all workers, expressed as
again in consumption-equivalent changes (ch;w, c

l;w and c

l;e). Column (1) replicates
column (3) in Table 1 as a benchmark for comparison. Column (2) shows that, when workers
in China earn 28% of the Western wage initially, the o¤shoring shock induces SBTC, brings
about a higher skill premium and hurts the unskilled workers in the US. Yet, when the initial
wage in China is su¢ ciently high, as in columns (3)-(5), the shock induces UBTC, and this
switch in the direction of technical change has important distributional implications favoring
the unskilled workers in the US. Starting from high levels of o¤shoring, unskilled workers in
the US start to gain (see columns (4) and (5)), and end up gaining even more than the skilled
workers in column (5).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
wl;e=wl;w jt=0 0.16 0.28 0.40 0.50 0.60
wl;e=wl;w jt= ~T 0.22 0.34 0.46 0.56 0.66
!w jt=0 1.9 2.3 2.57 2.71 2.75
!w jt= ~T 2.11 2.45 2.66 2.74 2.74
ch;w 6.14% 0.93% 0.64% 1.25% 1.83%
cl;w -2.32% -4.19% -2.10% 0.17% 1.96%
cl;e 26.63% 11.86% 9.60% 9.60% 10%
SBTC SBTC UBTC UBTC UBTC
Notes:  = 3:33; g=2%, no growth e¤ects
Table 2: Welfare E¤ects, Counterfactuals
In conclusion, the results in this section suggest that the welfare e¤ects of increased o¤-
shoring are highly asymmetric. For the realistic parameter values used in Table 1, our results
suggest that low-skill workers in the West may lose even in a dynastic world (where discounted
utility is the relevant criterion) with no credit market imperfections (that would prevent con-
sumption smoothing). In models with short-lived, non-altruistic agents, or in models where
agents cannot borrow against future wages, the welfare losses can become more pronounced.
27
An interesting implication of our analysis is that fostering innovation may be important at
counterbalancing the negative distributional e¤ects of o¤shoring because losses are less likley
in the high-growth scenario. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, our analysis also shows
that adverse distributional e¤ects of o¤shoring may become less pronounced, or even subside,
as the technological gap between China and the West declines because of the change in the
direction of technical change induced by o¤shoring.
6 Extensions
We now extend our benchmark model in two directions. First, we allow for o¤shoring in skill-
intensive intermediates/tasks. Second, we allow Eastern rms to transfer technology from the
West also by imitating Western technologies.
6.1 High-Skill Offshoring
To study the e¤ect of o¤shoring skill-intensive intermediates, we assume that the East is
endowed withHe units of skilled labor, but maintain that the West is skill abundant: Hw=Lw >
He=Le. For simplicity, we restrict the analysis to the BGP.
It is immediate to verify that, for given technology (Ah; Al) and o¤shoring rates (h; l),
the skill premia in the West and East are:
!w =

ZAh
Al
1 1= H^
L^
! 1= 
H^
L^
!1 
Lw
Hw
1  h
1  l
1 
and
!e =

ZAh
Al
1 1= H^
L^
! 1= 
H^
L^
!1 
Le
He
h
l
1 
;
where H^ 

1 He + (1  )1 Hw
1=
. The comparative statics of changes in (h; l)
follows directly from the baseline case.
More interesting results can be derived when o¤shoring is endogenous. We start from the
simpler case in which o¤shoring costs are the same in the two sectors. Then, the equilibrium
o¤shoring rate is pinned down by the conditions l;e = l;w and h;e = h;w: As in our
benchmark model with only low-skill o¤shoring, the BGP prot gap between domestic and
o¤shored rms must be equal to the o¤shoring cost, 1=. Substituting in the expressions of
prots yields:
l =

1 +  1=Lw=Le
 1
h =

1 +  1=Hw=He
 1
:
Since the East is skill-scarce, it is easy to see that the relative extent of o¤shoring, lh , declines
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monotonically from Hw=HeLw=Le to
1+Hw=He
1+Lw=Le
as  increases. Interestingly, o¤shoring is endogenously
more prevalent in the low-skill sector. This is intuitive: the relative abundance of unskilled
labor in the East induces Western rms to o¤shore production relatively more in the unskilled
sector. As  increases, however, o¤shoring increases relatively more in the lagging skilled
sector. This pattern accords well with the available evidence: for example, the volume of trade
in services, which are relatively skill-intensive, is lower than the volume of trade in intermediate
products, but it has recently grown at a faster rate (World Trade Report, 2008).
Next, the indi¤erence conditions between domestic and o¤shore production in both sectors
imply that the international wage gap in both sectors is given by:
wl;w
wl;e
=
wh;w
wh;e
= 
 1
 :
It follows immediately that the skill premium is the same in both countries. This is an impor-
tant result: o¤shoring generates conditional factor price equalization, even if the two countries
are fully specialized and have di¤erent technological capabilities. This result is driven by the
assumption that the cost of o¤shoring is the same in both sectors, which in turn implies that
the value of o¤shoring, which is proportional to the East-West wage di¤erence, must also be
equalized. This is accomplished by a higher o¤shoring rate in the unskilled sector, so as to
increase the relative demand and hence the wage for unskilled workers in the East.
The BGP skill premium, ! = !w = !e , is now:
! = Z 1
 
L^
H^
!1 +
1  h
1  l
Lw
Hw
1 
= Z 1
 
L^
H^
!1 + 
Lw + 
1=Le
Hw + 
1=He
!1 
:
The fact that Hw=Lw > He=Le implies that an increase in  raises both terms in parenthe-
sis. Intuitively, o¤shoring has a larger impact in the unskilled sector because the East has a
relatively larger endowment of unskilled workers. It follows that the comparative statics to
changes in  are similar to the baseline case. In particular, depending on the elasticities  and
, the relationship between  and !w is still likely to be non-monotonic. Figure 6 plots the
relationship between ! and the extent of o¤shoring, ; using the calibration of Section 5. The
graph shows both the previously studied case in which He = 0 (solid line) and the case in which
10% of workers in the East are skilled (dashed line). As the gure makes clear, adding high-
skill o¤shoring does not change the qualitative relationship between the skill premium in the
West and o¤shoring: the shape of the two lines is similar, with the only di¤erence that, with
a larger skill-endowment in the East, the e¤ect of o¤shoring on the skill premium is smaller
(the red line is below the black line). Interestingly, for su¢ ciently low levels of o¤shoring, a
fall in o¤shoring costs raises skill premia both in the origin and destination countries. These
predictions are broadly consistent with the evidence reported in Ge and Yang (2012), who nd
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Figure 6: High-Skill O¤shoring and the Skill Premium. The gure shows the relationship
between o¤shoring () and the world skill premium (!) for the cases  = 1:6;  = 3:33;
He=Le = 0:11 (dashed), He=Le = 0 (solid). See Section 5 for the other parameters.
that the college premium in China increased from around 1.3 in 1992 to more than 1.6 in 2007,
and in Sheng and Yang (2012), who nd that processing exports and FDI can account for 75%
of the increase in the Chinese college wage premium between 2000 and 2006.
The results are easily generalized to the case in which o¤shoring costs are di¤erent in
the two sectors. In this case, the BGP skill premium would also vary across locations. In
particular, if the cost of o¤shoring was larger for high-skill jobs (h < l), then there would be
less H-o¤shoring, resulting in lower demand for skilled workers in the East and a lower skill
premium compared to the West:
!e = !w

h
l
 1 

:
Overall, the generalized model of o¤shoring can explain why, despite its scarcity of skilled
labor, the skill premium in China is lower than in the United States and why it has increased
in both countries.
6.2 Imitation, Trade and Offshoring
So far, the only mode of technology transfer from West to East has been o¤shoring. In this
section, we add the possibility for local rms in the East to imitate Western technologies.
Imitation is modelled as an inferior form of technology transfer: the labor productivity for
producing an intermediate is lower with imitation than under o¤shoring, for example because
tacit knowledge of Western rms prevents perfect imitation. However, imitation entails no
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payment of monopoly rents to the innovating rms in the West. We show that in this envi-
ronment, two regimes emerge in equilibrium: as long as o¤shoring costs are su¢ ciently high,
technology transfer occurs only through imitation. However, when o¤shoring costs become
su¢ ciently low, o¤shoring starts prevailing and less productive local imitating rms gradually
disappear.
More specically, we assume that Eastern rms can copy existing intermediates at a small
cost and become local monopolists. However, technology transfer via imitation is imperfect:
imitated intermediates are produced with a worse technology, with labor productivity equal
to ' < 1. There is free trade in nal goods, Yh and Yl. Intermediates can also be traded, but
foreign trade entails a small ow cost to be paid independently of the quantity exported. As
a result, trade in nal goods will equalize prices in both countries and there will be no trade
in individual intermediates.28
To simplify the analysis further, in this extension we focus on the case where ' < : Then,
the monopoly price charged by a rm that o¤shores production to the East is lower than the
marginal cost of a local imitator. In this case, o¤shoring would drive imitated intermediates
out of business, and the equilibrium conditions of the benchmark model without imitation
would continue to hold for o¤shored intermediates.
Let us now start with the benchmark without o¤shoring (but with imitation), which is
similar to the world economy with trade but no IPR studied in Acemoglu (2003). Then
Eastern rms will imitate all varieties, and there will be trade in Yh and Yl only. The relative
(world) price of these goods will be:
Ph
Pl
=

Ah
Al
ZHw
Lw + 'Le
 1=
(31)
The skill bias of the technology is determined by the incentive to innovate in the West. The
relative protability of skill-complementary technologies is:
Vh
Vl
=
h;w
l;w
=
PhZHw
PlLw
:
Along the BGP, all types of innovations must be equally protable, thus Vh = Vl. This
28The assumption of (small) trade costs, which is quite realistic, avoids complications arising from two pro-
ducers being active in the same market. More formally, the equilibrium can be described by the following game.
There are two producers (Eastern and Western monopolist) of the same variety. The Eastern producer has a
technlogical disadvantage, but this is perfectly o¤set in equilibrium by a lower wage. The innitesimal trade
cost keeps the two market segmented. The Eastern producer knows that, if it paid the trade cost, it would
enter a stage game in the Western market in which Bertrand competition would drive prots to zero. The
same argument keeps the Western producer from entering the Eastern market. Therefore, in equilibrium, each
producer serves the local market. See Acemoglu, Gancia and Zilibotti (2012) for details. Note that we could
alternatively rule out Eastern export of varieties to the West by assuming that these would constitute a violation
of IPR that are protected in the West
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condition combined with (31) yields BGP relative technologies as:
Ah
Al
=

ZHw
Lw
 Lw + 'Le
ZHw
: (32)
Intuitively, in a world with no o¤shoring, imitation a¤ects the direction of technological
progress in the West through the price e¤ect there is no market size e¤ect because of lack of
IPR. Better imitations (higher ') leads to greater production of unskilled goods in the East
and so to a higher relative price of skilled goods. This induces SBTC.
Now consider a reduction in o¤shoring costs that makes o¤shoring protable. In this case,
there would be a switch from a BGP with only imitation to one with pure o¤shoring. To rst
determine the condition for o¤shoring to start, note that o¤shoring will be protable, starting
from a BGP without o¤shoring, when
~ol;e   l;w
r
 f; (33)
where ol;e denotes the prot of an individual Western rm that deviates from a no-o¤shoring
equilibrium and o¤shores production to the Eastern market. Such a deviating rm can pay
Eastern workers a wage that is only a fraction ' of the Western wage, and yet can use the
state-of-the-art technology. l;w is the equilibrium prot in the West under no o¤shoring, and
r = l;w= is the corresponding BGP interest rate. Thus, condition (33) ensures that starting
from the BGP with only imitation, o¤shoring will be protable. Substituting for prots, (33)
can equivalently be rewritten as:
'   1  : (34)
When condition (34) holds, starting from the BGP with only imitation, Western rms
will nd it protable to o¤shore to the East. Let us now characterize the BGP that emerges
after o¤shoring. The rst important observation is that although in a BGP with o¤shoring
only a fraction  of the varieties are o¤shored, there will be no imitation in the remaining
intermediates. The reason is that all Eastern producers now face higher wages: though in the
BGP without o¤shoring, the technological disadvantage of the Eastern producers was o¤set by
the lower wages in the East enabling local producers with imitated technology to be active
in all markets this is no longer the case with o¤shoring, and thus low-productivity imitators
in the East can no longer survive when Eastern wages are pushed up due to o¤shoring. As a
result, o¤shoring induces specialization: in the new BGP, the East will export the intermediates
produced in the o¤shored sectors to the West, and the West will produce and export to the East
the remaining intermediates. Inferior (imitated) technologies will be abandoned altogether.
The transitional dynamics are particularly interesting. Consider an increase in  triggering
the transition from a BGP with only imitation to a BGP with o¤shoring. After the increase
in , we will rst have a period of o¤shoring in which, for reasons we have already discussed
in Section 4, there will be no innovation. During this phase, o¤shoring will also push out low-
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productivity imitating rms in the East. Interestingly, however, during this process, wages in
the East do not increase until all low-productivity (imitator) rms have exited the market.
This perfectly elastic behavior of wages in the East is central for encouraging o¤shoring. Thus,
equilibrium dynamics take the form of rapid growth accompanied by the reallocation of workers
from low-productivity rms to high-productivity rms with no wage growth. The intuition for
this result is related to Song et al. (2011), who also provide evidence that this is a good
description of the process of economic growth in China over the last three decades. Our
economic mechanism is di¤erent however. In Song et al. (2011), wages are kept low due to the
presence of ine¢ cient state-owned enterprises and the credit market constraints slowing the
expansion of private sector rms. Here wages are kept low due to imitators and the gradual
equilibrium expansion of the o¤shored sector.
The transitional dynamics enter their second phase only when all low-productivity imitators
have exited the market and at this point, wages in the East start growing again. In this
second phase, the rest of the transition to BGP is identical to the dynamics described in
Section 4: First, there is now a stage characterized by only o¤shoring. Increasing wages in the
East reduce the incentive for o¤shoring. The rst stage of the transition is over when either
skilled or unskilled innovation becomes as protable as o¤shoring. Then, the second stage of
the transition starts, where both o¤shoring and one type of innovation coexist. Eventually,
innovation is restored in both skilled and unskilled activities, and  stays constant at its BGP
level. Whether the second stage features SBTC or UBTC again depends on whether (24) is
higher or lower than (32) evaluated at ' > 
1 
 .
The extension described in this subsection also has interesting implications about IPR
policies. In the pure o¤shoring regime, better IPR in the East corresponds to a higher , and
triggers technological convergence between the East and the West (and as we have emphasized,
in most cases higher wage inequality in the West). The implications are reversed in the region
where the equilibrium only involves imitation. In this case, stronger IPR, which correspond to
a decrease in ' and thus limit the extent of imitation, also slow down technological convergence
and SBTC.29 In consequence, in the model enriched with imitation, the impact of international
IPR on technological convergence (and likely on wage inequality in the West) is non-monotonic.
7 Conclusions
O¤shoring of jobs to low-wage countries and skill-biased technical change are among the most
prominent and ercely debated trends of the US labor market. This paper has shown how these
29Moreover, in the pure imitation regime, a reduction in ' triggered by stronger IPR causes a reduction in
the skill premium in the West. To see why, note that the skill premium in the West can be expressed as:
!w = Z
PhAh
PlAl
=

ZHw
Lw
 1
Lw + 'Le
Hw
;
which is increasing in ':
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two phenomena are likely to be strongly interlinked because of the impact of o¤shoring on
the direction of technical change.
Our theoretical analysis provides several new insights on these interlinkages. Most im-
portantly, we show that a decline in the cost of o¤shoring intermediates/tasks has in general
ambiguous e¤ects on the level of wages, the skill premium and the direction of technical change.
Nevertheless, our analysis clearly identies the contrasting e¤ects and when some dominate the
others. In particular, in the most plausible scenario, starting from an equilibrium with a low
volume of o¤shoring, a decline in o¤shoring costs triggers a transition characterized initially by
falling real wages for unskilled workers in the West and followed by rapid skill-biased technical
change. These implications highlight why, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, o¤shoring
could have a major impact on wage inequality even when the extent of trade and o¤shoring is
limited. They also suggest that, despite leaving out several important determinants of wage
inequality in the US, our model accords fairly well with the available evidence on US labor
market trends of the 1980s and early 1990s. The implications of o¤shoring are very di¤erent,
however, once its volume reaches a critical level: in this case, further o¤shoring will induce
unskilled-biased technical change and a lower skill premium. This suggests that the future
potential distributional e¤ects of o¤shoring could be quite di¤erent than its past impact.
We also characterized the dynamics of wages and technology in the face of increasing
o¤shoring. An interesting result here is that convergence to the new balance growth path
equilibrium follows a stage in which o¤shoring halts innovation in the West, thus indicating
that o¤shoring and innovation are substitutes in the short run. However, they turn out to
be complements in the long run, in that protable o¤shoring tends to increase the rate of
innovation in the long run, and also the welfare implications of o¤shoring are more positive
when the baseline rate of innovation in the economy is greater.
Our framework further permits an investigation of the welfare e¤ects of o¤shoring. Work-
ers in the East are the clear winners because o¤shoring enables them to benet from better
technology. Skilled workers in the West typically tend to benet also (though the opposite
could happen), and unskilled workers could end up worse o¤, even if the future wage growth
is fully factored in and consumption smoothing is allowed without any credit constraints.
Finally, the tractable nature of our framework enables several extensions, two of which
we have discussed. First, we studied o¤shoring of both skilled and unskilled intermediates,
which naturally leads to a pattern in which there will be greater unskilled o¤shoring, but
skilled o¤shoring will also take place, at least after a while. An interesting implication of
this model is a form of conditional factor price equalization from the prot maximization of
o¤shoring rms. This result also implies that, in contrast to the standard Stolper-Samuelson
theorem, globalization can lead to higher skill premia even in skill-scarce countries. Second, we
investigated the transition of the East from low-productivity imitation to higher-productivity
o¤shoring, which leads to a pattern of transition reminiscent of the Chinese process of economic
growth over the last three decades, with productivity gains from reallocation associated with
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no wage growth.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The e¤ect of  on !w follows from (15) as discussed in the text. To establish the e¤ect of 
on wl;w, di¤erentiate (16) to obtain:
d lnwl;w
d
= 
dL^
d
  1  
1   ;
where   1 +(1  1=)(AhZHw=AlL^)
 1

L^+L^(AhZHw=AlL^)
 1

. As  ! ; dL^d ! 0; hence, wl;w decreases unam-
biguously with o¤shoring at high level of : As  ! 0, dL^d ! 1; hence, the sign of the e¤ect
depends on the sign of . Note that  is positive if  <  (i.e., 1  > 1=). However, if  > 
(i.e., 1   < 1=), then  is negative provided that
AhZHw
AlL^
>

(1  ) 
1   (1  )
 
 1
:
Since lim!0 L^ = Lw and using (15) and   1= (1  ), this condition can be rewritten as
(17) in the main text. The real wages of all other workers are wh;w = Zph;w and wl;e = pl;e.
Using (4), (6), (7), (9), (11) and (13) yields:
wh;w = 

Y
AhZHw
 1

ZAh, and
wl;e = 

Y
Al
 1

AlL^
1  1=


Le
1 
:
Both wh;w and wl;e are increasing in  since dYd > 0, and because, as can be readily veried,
L^1  1=1  is increasing in .
A.2 Statement of Proposition 2 for  > 
Proposition 4 Suppose  <  and  > 1: Then the BGP is unique and in the BGP, an
increase in o¤shoring opportunities, parameterized by :
 increases the o¤shoring rate, ;
 increases the equilibrium interest rate, r, and the growth rate, g;
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 reduces the skill bias of technology (Ah=Al);
 decreases the skill premium, !w, if  1 < ; induces a U-shaped reaction in the skill
premium, !w, if  1 >  [i.e., it decreases !w for low initial , and increases !w for
high initial ];
 reduces the wage gap between unskilled workers in the East and in the West, wl;e=wl;w.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
A.3.1 Preliminary results
Lemma 1 Suppose there are no unanticipated shocks for all t  s, and at t = s, Vz = , with
z = fh; lg. Then Vz =  for all t > s. Similarly, if at t = s we have V ol   Vl = f , then
V ol   Vl = f for all t > s.
Proof. If Vz =  at t = s, but Vz <  later, then it would imply an anticipated capital loss,
violating (18) or (19).
Lemma 2 The conditions Vl;= Vh =  and V ol   Vl = f are both necessary and su¢ cient for
the economy to be in a BGP.
Proof. Vh = Vl =  and V ol   Vl = f are simultaneously satised only for unique value of ,
which in turn denes Ah=Al uniquely.
Let us also dene
roff 

~l;e   l;w

=f , rh  h;w=, and rl  l;w=:
Here roff is the equilibrium interest rate when there is positive o¤shoring (it follows from
V ol   Vl = f); rh is the equilibrium interest rate when there is positive technical change in the
skilled sector (it follows from Vh = ); rl is the equilibrium interest rate when there is positive
technical change in the unskilled sector (it follows from Vl = ).
Finally, note that, as in Caselli and Ventura (2000), aggregation holds in the world economy,
since agents have CRRA utility, and capital markets are perfectly integrated (i.e., agents can
invest their savings in both local and foreign assets). Thus agents only di¤er by their wealth
and labor endowments.
A.3.2 General characterization
Given no uncertainty, no arbitrage implies that r (Ah;t; Al;t; t) = max froff ; rh; rlg : In a BGP,
roff = rh = rl (see equation (21)). The world equilibrium path can then be described by the
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following system of di¤erential equations:
_Ct
Ct
= r (Ah;t; Al;t; t)   (35)
 _Ah;t + (+ ft) _Al;t + fAl;t _t = Y (Ah;t; Al;t; t)  Ct (36)
with boundary conditions given by 0, Ah;0 and Al;0 at t = 0 and the transversality condition
(2). Here C is the consumption of the world representative agent, and Y is the world GDP,
dened as
Y (Ah;t; Al;t; t) =
0@1 + Al;tL^ (t)
Ah;tZHw
!  1
"
1A

 1
Ah;tZHw;
where, recall, L^ (t) =
h
1 t Le + (1  t)1  Lw
i1=
.
Consider now the impact e¤ect of a (positive) o¤shoring shock. Since l;e, l;w and h;w
(and, hence, rh and rl) are not a¤ected by changes in either f or ~, while roff increases if
either f falls or ~ increases, then, upon the shock, the following condition must hold:
r (Ah;t; Al;t; t) = roff > rh = rl: (37)
Lemma 1 guarantees that o¤shoring never stops for t > 0. Thus, for all t > 0, r (Ah;t; Al;t; t) =
roff ; implying that
r (Ah;t; Al;t; t) =
 
Y (Ah;t; Al;t; t)
Al;0L^ (t)
! 1
 (1  )
f

L^ (t)
1 
~

Le
t

 

Lw
1  t

:
A.3.3 The rst stage of the transition: pure o¤shoring
In the rst stage of the transition, (37) implies that V ol   Vl = f; Vh <  and Vl < . Then,
the dynamical system, (35)-(36), simplies to:
_Ct
Ct
= r (Ah;0; Al;0; t)   (38)
fAl;0 _t = Y (Ah;0; Al;0; t)  Ct (39)
where 0 is pinned down by the pre-shock BGP condition, 0 =

1 + 
 1=
0 Lw=Le
 1
. The
assumption that the economy starts from a BGP further implies that
Ah;0 = (ZHw)
 1

1 0 L

e + (1  0)1  Lw
 1 +


Lw + 
1=
0 Le
 
Al:0:
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Thus, for given Al;0, Ah;0 is uniquely pin down by the BGP requirement.
Next, we prove that the pure o¤shoring stage of the transition (roff > rh and roff > rl)
must end in nite time, restoring positive innovation. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that
this is not the case, so there is no innovation thereafter. First, we can rule out that (for any
" > 0) r (Ah;0; Al;0; t) > + " for all t. If this were true, Ct would grow unboundedly, which
contradicts the fact that with no innovation Y (Ah;0; Al;0; t) is bounded (recall, in particular,
that t  , so continuous growth without innovation is not possible). This implies that,
without innovation, the dynamical system must converge to a steady state with zero growth
and with r (Ah;0; Al;0; ) = . But rh;t >  throughout, since rh;0 >  and rh is increasing
in , which is itself increasing along the transition path. This implies that at some point
r (Ah;0; Al;0; ) = rh;t, triggering skill-biased innovations, and yielding a contradiction.
We have so far established that the post-shock dynamics cannot lead to a new BGP in
which there is no innovation. Next, look at whether the stage of pure o¤shoring is followed by
SBTC or UBTC. Note that, during the pure o¤shoring stage of transition,
rl;t
rh;t
=

Ah;0
Al;0
 1

(ZHw)
1 


L^ (t)
1   1


Lw
1  t

:
In general, it is ambiguous whether rl=rh is increasing or decreasing in : However, it is easy
to establish that there exists ^ 2 (0; ) such that (i) rl=rh is decreasing in  for  < ^; (ii)
rl=rh is increasing in  for   ^: This can be seen from the derivative:
@ ln (rl=rh)
@
=

1    1


@ ln L^
@
+

1  :
By assumption, 1  1= < 0. Then, the result follows form the fact that @ ln L^=@ decreases
monotonically from1 at ! 0 to 0 at ! . In case (i), the pure o¤shoring stage is followed
by a stage of the transition in which the equilibrium features o¤shoring and SBTC (V ol  Vl = f;
Vh =  and Vl < ). In case (ii), the stage of pure o¤shoring is followed by a stage in which the
equilibrium features o¤shoring and UBTC (V ol  Vl = f; Vl =  and Vh < ). The convergence
to the new BGP must be studies separately for each of the two cases.
A.3.4 Second stage of the transition: o¤shoring+factor biased technical change
Case 1: SBTC ( < ^) We start by pinning down the o¤shoring rate, SBTC ; that triggers
a switch from pure o¤shoring to SBTC+o¤shoring ( _t > 0; _Ah;t > 0 and _Al;t = 0). SBTC is
implicitely determined by the condition roff = rh; which can be rewritten as
Ah;0
Al;0
=
L^
 
SBTC
1 +
(ZHw)
1 

~

Le
SBTC

 

Lw
1  SBTC
 f


:
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As proven above, t will attain SBTC in nite time. Let T > 0 denote the time in which
SBTC+o¤shoring starts (T = SBTC). Note that T can be determined by numerical integra-
tion. For all t  T , the condition roff = rh must hold, and this yields
Ah;t = Ah (t) =
L^ (t)
1 +
(ZHw)
1 

~

Le
t

 

Lw
1  t
 f


Al;0: (40)
The equilibrium dynamics can therefore be expressed as:
_Ct
Ct
= r (Ah (t) ; Al;0; t)  ; (41)

d
dt
Ah (t) + fAl;0

_t = Y (Ah (t) ; Al;0; t)  Ct; (42)
for t  T; with the initial condition T = SBTC : Note that equation (40) allows us to reduce
the number of state variables in the dynamic system to one.
Next, we show that this stage comes to an end (i.e., even the low-skill innovation is restored)
in nite time. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that the SBTC+o¤shoring stage never ends.
Since   , (40) implies that Ah (t) and Y (Ah (t) ; Al;0; t) are bounded. Thus, the same
argument used to prove that the stage of pure o¤shoring must end in nite time can be
used to establish that (i) if the transition featuring SBTC+o¤shoring continued forever, then
r (Ah (t) ; Al;0; t) would fall to , and the economy would attain a steady state with zero
growth; (ii) in converging to a steady state with zero growth, r would decline su¢ ciently to
trigger unskill-biased innovations, yielding a contradiction.
In summary, the argument above establishes that there exists ~T <1 such that, for t  ~T ,
V ol   Vl = f; Vh = Vl = ; and the economy attains the new BGP. Formally, one can add the
terminal condition  ~T =

1 +  1=Lw=Le
 1
(where  is the after-shock o¤shorability index)
to the system (41)(42), and determine the nite time for such a switch ~T .
Case 2: UBTC (  ^) In this case, the conditions V ol   Vl = f and Vl =  must hold
simultanously, i.e., roff = rl. But because this is the condition that determines the BGP
level of o¤horing, in this stage  must be at its (after-shock) BGP level (22). Since (22) only
depends on exogenous parameters, in this stage there is o¤shoring, but  remains constant
over time. The system of equations characterizing equilibrium simplies then to
_Ct
Ct
= r (Ah;0; Al;t; )  ; (43)
(+ f) _Al;t = Y (Ah;0; Al;t; )  Ct: (44)
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This is a system of autonomous di¤erential equations in Ct and Al;t; with the initial condition
Al;T = Al;0: It is straightforward to show, as in case 1, that this transition cannot go forever,
since the technology features decreasing returns to Al;t (holding constant  and Ah), and thus r
would fall to : However, this is impossible, and thus innovation in the skilled sector is restored
in nite time. In fact, skill-biased innovation is restored as soon as rl = rh: This occurs at
t = ~T such that
Al; ~T = Ah;0

L^ ()
1  1= Lw
1  

(ZHw)
1= 1

:
Thereafter the BGP dynamics apply.
A.3.5 Equilibrium consumption trajectories
Full equilibrium dynamics can be characterized by solving for equilibrium consumption tra-
jectory, and in particular for C0. At t = ~T ; consumption must be consistent with its BGP
expression. In particular, the BGP expression of consumption yields
C
Al
=

Y (Ah; Al; )
Al
  g

1 +
Ah
Al

;
C
Ah
=
 
Y (Ah; Al; )
Ah
  g
 
1 +

Ah
Al
 1!!
;
where g =
h
L^1 

Lw + 
1=Le
i 1
+ (ZHw)
 1
 1
 1
(1  ) =    and, recall, Ah=Al;
Y=Ah and Y=Al are constant in a BGP. Then, in case 1 (  ^),
C ~T =

Y (Ah; Al; )
Al
  g

1 +

Ah
Al

Al;0;
whereas, in case 2 ( > ^),
C ~T =
 
Y (Ah; Al; )
Ah
  g
 
1 +

Ah
Al
 1!!
Ah;0:
In addition, for all t  ~T , the time paths of ; Ah;t and Al;t are fully determine. Note, in
particular, that in case 1 Al; ~T = Al;0; and in case 2 Ah; ~T = Ah;0; which yields the expressions
for all other variables at time ~T (in terms of the BGP expressions of Ah=Al; Y=Ah and Y=Al).
Given the terminal conditions fC ~T ; Ah; ~T ; Al; ~T ;  ~T g, the system of di¤erential equation (41)
(42) in case 1 and (43)-(44) in case 2 can be integrated backwards to yield a solution for
fCT ; Ah;T ; Al;T ; T g; where, recall, T is the the endpoint of the rst stage of the transition
(pure o¤shoring). Likewise, one can use fCT ; Ah;T ; Al;T ; T g as the terminal condition of the
40
rst stage of the transition to integrate backwards the system of di¤erential equations (38)-
(39), and nd a solution for the initial consumption, C0; given the other initial conditions,
Ah;0; Al;0; 0. (Recall here that Al;0 is an arbitrary initial condition, whereas Ah;0 and 0 are
pinned down by the initial BGP equilibrium condition).
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